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DISPARATE IMPACT 2.0: KARLO PROVIDES A LONG-AWAITED
UPDATE FOR ADEA SUBGROUP PLAINTIFFS
Zachary J. Weber*

I. INTRODUCTION: THE NECESSITY OF PROTECTING AGING EMPLOYEES
The economic recession of 2008-2010 hit few industries harder than
the auto industry. In the U.S. alone, hundreds of thousands of auto
workers lost their jobs due to financial cutbacks and production
stoppages.1 Naturally, businesses reliant on the auto industry, such as
manufacturers of auto glass, suffered as well.2 Pittsburgh Glass Works
(“PGW”) was one of those businesses.3 Facing a reduction-in-force
(“RIF”) of up to 12% of its employees, it hurried to decide which
employees to terminate, resulting in the hasty firing of many long-time
employees.4 Rudolph Karlo had worked at PGW as an engineer for over
thirty years while receiving consistently positive evaluations, earning
regular promotions, and working to develop eight patents to benefit his
company.5 Still, PGW abruptly terminated Karlo in 2009.6 The
company’s stated reason for his termination was that Karlo was not
“adaptable” and that his supervisor could not “see [him] moving forward
with the company.”7 Karlo, along with several coworkers who had
received similar explanations for their terminations, noticed that a
disproportionate number of PGW employees over fifty were laid off.8
Understandably, Karlo and his colleagues believed that age, not
“adaptability,” was the determining factor in the layoff.9 To them, the
RIF was about more than saving money; it was about eliminating an
aging workforce.
Employment discrimination based on age has been an identifiable

* Associate Member, 2016-2017 University of Cincinnati Law Review.
1. A Timeline of Auto Sector Layoffs, CBCNEWS CANADA (Feb. 9, 2009, 2:31 PM),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/a-timeline-of-auto-sector-layoffs-1.721556.
2. Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, No. 2:10-cv-1283, 2015 WL 5156913, at *1 (W.D.
Pa. Sep. 2, 2015).
3. Id. at *1-2.
4. Id. at *1-2. During one phase of layoffs, PGW’s acting HR director ordered his managers to
identify terminable employees with instructions to do an “ASAP organization assessment,” and to “risk
going too far, too fast . . . verses [sic] the opposite.”
5. Second Amended Complaint at 31-32, Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, No. 2:10-cv1283, 2014 WL 11115751 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2014).
6. Id. at 33.
7. Id. at 34.
8. Id. at 147.
9. Id. at 149.
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problem in the U.S. since at least the 1960s.10 In fact, when Congress
enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA” or “Act”)
in 1967, it did so with an obvious correlation to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which addressed other problematic forms of
workplace discrimination.11 Besides the temporal and topical proximity
of the two Acts, they also share noticeably similar language.12 As this
Casenote discusses below, this resemblance led courts to treat the
statutes with similar jurisprudence in the early years of their existence.13
However, as courts struggled with proper application of these Acts to
increasingly diverse circumstances, their differences became more
apparent.14 Not only were courts aware of the inherent dissimilarities
between age discrimination and the types of discrimination prohibited
by Title VII,15 they were also uncertain how to interpret a specific
provision in the ADEA—absent from Title VII—that permits otherwise
discriminatory acts for “reasonable factors other than age” (“RFOA”).16
This Casenote explores the similarities and differences in courts’
handling of the two Acts before analyzing some recent court decisions
regarding the ADEA. Specifically, it addresses the question of whether
subgroups of plaintiffs may raise disparate impact claims under ADEA.
Section II begins with a synopsis of relevant Supreme Court and
Appellate Court cases that set the stage for the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals’ decision in Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC.17 Then,
Section III analyzes the Karlo decision in light of prior disparate impact
jurisprudence and scholarship. Agreeing with the Karlo court, this
Casenote proposes that a plain reading of the ADEA compels the
recognition of subgroup claims for disparate impact discrimination. This
recognition would be consistent with both Supreme Court precedent and
the original objective of the ADEA. Despite outdated decisions to the
contrary by three circuit courts of appeals,18 recognition of disparate
10. See infra Section II.A.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2016). Title VII prohibits discriminatory employment practices
“because of . . . race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
12. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2016) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”) with 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2016) (“It shall be unlawful for an
employer . . . . [to] discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s age . . . .”).
13. See infra Sections II.A, II.B.
14. See infra Sections II.C, II.D.
15. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 238 (2005).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2016).
17. Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 2017).
18. See infra Section II.D. The three decisions referenced here were made before Smith, which
drastically altered the landscape of disparate impact claims under the ADEA. Two of the decisions were
also made before O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996), which eliminated the
necessity for ADEA plaintiffs to prove that an employer discriminated against the entire class protected
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impact claims for subgroups is the only consistent and logical
interpretation of the Act’s language and purpose.
II. BACKGROUND: IMPLEMENTATION AND EVOLUTION OF THE ADEA
A. Legislative History of the ADEA
While debating which classes to protect from employment
discrimination under Title VII, Congress considered a protection for
older workers.19 Ultimately, it rejected this proposal.20 Refusing to
abandon the issue of age discrimination, Congress requested the
Secretary of Labor to conduct a study on age discrimination in the
workplace and report on his findings.21 The resulting report, commonly
called the “Wirtz Report” after then-Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz,22
observed that age discrimination did not result from animus or
intolerance like other types of discrimination.23 Rather, age
discrimination arose from the presumption that older workers were not
as effective employees as younger workers, along with other
“[i]nstitutional arrangements that indirectly restrict the employment of
older workers.”24 So, while the report found justification to protect older
workers, it did not equate age with the protected traits covered in Title
VII.
Nonetheless, when Congress passed the ADEA just two years after
the Wirtz Report, its language was nearly identical to Title VII.25 Both
Acts prohibited the same adverse employment actions “because of”
certain protected traits.26 However, one significant difference between
the two was the inclusion of the RFOA exception that has no equivalent
in Title VII. Responding to the Wirtz Report’s distinction between age
and other protected traits, the RFOA clause would provide employers
significant leeway to implement practices that harmed older employees

by the ADEA. Instead, the court held that the ADEA protects against discrimination because of age, not
because of class membership.
19. 110 CONG. REC. 2596-2599 (1964).
20. Id. (The amendment was voted down 123 to 94).
21. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 715, 78 Stat. 241, 265.
22. W. Willard Wirtz, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO CONGRESS UNDER
SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1965), reprinted in E.E.O.C., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT (1981) [hereinafter WIRTZ REPORT].
23. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232 (2005) (citing WIRTZ REPORT, supra note
22, at 5).
24. See id. (citing WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 22, at 15).
25. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
26. Id.
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if age discrimination was not the only motivating factor.27 Additionally,
Congress created another distinction between Title VII and the ADEA
when it amended the former in 1991 to codify mixed-motive claims for
Title VII discrimination.28 The ADEA has never received comparable
treatment from Congress or the courts, despite a vigorous debate that
even divided the Supreme Court.29 These two differences between Title
VII and the ADEA—the RFOA provision and the 1991 Amendment—
have led the two statutes down very different paths within the courts.30
B. Griggs and Teal: The Origins of Title VII Disparate Impact Cases
Courts have never questioned whether Title VII and the ADEA
prohibited “disparate treatment” discrimination, i.e., intentional acts of
discrimination against a protected class.31 Indeed, the statutory language
indicates that this prohibition is the very reason Congress implemented
these Acts. Yet the statutes are not as clear about “disparate impact”
discrimination. This type of discrimination occurs when a facially
neutral employment practice has a discriminatory effect on protected
employees.
This latter category of discrimination was the central issue in Griggs
v. Duke Power Co.,32 a case that made its way to the Supreme Court in
1971. Prior to the passage of Title VII, Duke Power had a history of
intentional discrimination against African-American employees, and
limited them to the lowest-paying jobs in the company.33 On the very
day Title VII became effective, the company changed its policy to
eliminate intentional discrimination, but implemented a requirement that
applicants for certain positions have a high school diploma and pass a
general aptitude test.34 Soon after, a group of African-American
27. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., 557 U.S. 167, 177-178 (2009) (barring “mixed-motive”
claims for ADEA plaintiffs). Mixed motive claims are claims that arise from adverse employment
actions where the employer demonstrated a combination of legitimate and discriminatory motives.
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2016).
29. See Gross, 557 U.S. at 180, 190. Justice Thomas, writing for the majority in a 5-4 decision,
interpreted the absence of a parallel ADEA amendment as notice of Congress’s intent to bar mixedmotive claims under the ADEA. Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, refused to attach such
significance to the 1991 Amendment, instead recognizing the similarity in Title VII and ADEA
jurisprudence before the Amendment.
30. Compare Gross, 557 U.S. at 180 with Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258
(recognizing that mixed-motive claims are permissible under Title VII, but holding that a defendant may
avoid liability in these cases by proving that it would have made the same decision absent any
discriminatory intent).
31. See, e.g., Hazen Paper v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993); EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch
Stores, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015).
32. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
33. Id. at 426-427.
34. Id. at 427-428.
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employees filed a complaint under Title VII alleging that Duke Power’s
new practices still constituted racial discrimination.35 The plaintiffs did
not aver direct, intentional discrimination;36 rather, they relied on
evidence that African-American employees were disqualified from most
well-paying positions because of the requirements.37 Ultimately, the
district court found the practices permissible under Title VII on the
grounds that they had a legitimate business purpose and applied equally
to all employees at Duke Power.38 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that the practices were
generally permissible under Title VII, but that the new
nondiscriminatory practices should not shield an employer from liability
for past discriminatory practices.39
For such a complex and novel issue at the time, the Supreme Court
decided Griggs with a curiously brief and unanimous opinion.40 The
Court began its analysis by looking to Congress’s intent in passing Title
VII, stating plainly that it was “to achieve equality of employment
opportunities and remove barriers” that might favor certain employees
over others.41 Going against the lower courts, the Court here declared
that Congress directed the Act at eliminating practices that resulted in
discrimination, not only those motivated by discrimination.42 Even
procedures and practices that are facially neutral are prohibited “if they
operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory employment
practices.”43 While recognizing that Congress permits job-related tests to
influence employment decisions,44 the Court insisted that these tests
must relate directly to job performance.45 The Court concluded that its
determination was consistent with both the purpose of the Act and the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) interpretation
of the Act.46
In line with this analysis, the Court held that employers may be liable
under Title VII for practices that lack discriminatory intent but still have

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
decision.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243, 244 (M.D.N.C. 1968).
Id. at 245.
Id. at 247.
Id. at 251.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1237 (4th Cir. 1970).
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971). Justice Brennan took no part in the
Id. at 429-430.
Id. at 432.
Id. at 430.
See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2016).
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436.
Id.
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a discriminatory effect against a protected class of employees.47
Employment-related tests and requirements are permissible, but the
employer has the burden of demonstrating the connection between the
test and the job.48 This decision gave birth to the disparate impact theory
of liability in employment discrimination49—that employers may be
liable for facially neutral practices when they harm members of a
protected class at a disproportionate rate. Henceforth, the theories of
disparate treatment and disparate impact would become fundamental to
courts’ analyses of discrimination claims and would work to permit
claims that courts had previously denied.50
Following the Court’s decision in Griggs, Title VII disparate impact
claims became commonplace when an employer’s practice negatively
affected an entire class of protected employees.51 But in Connecticut v.
Teal,52 the Court faced the question of whether disparate impact claims
were valid when an employment procedure unfavorably affected some,
but not all, employees in a protected class.
The plaintiffs in Teal were a group of African-American employees
of a state agency who had been disqualified for promotion based on the
results a written examination.53 Unlike the plaintiffs in Griggs, however,
the plaintiffs here were a subgroup of the class of protected employees
because not all African-American employees had been disqualified by
the test.54 In an interesting twist to this case, while African-American
employees were disproportionately eliminated from competing for
promotion by the test, those who passed the test received promotions at
a disproportionately higher rate than white employees.55 As a result, the
employer argued that the process as a whole was not discriminatory
because the end result—the “bottom line”—had no disparate impact on
47. Id.
48. Id. at 432.
49. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (using the term
“disparate impact” for the first time to describe the type of discrimination found in Griggs); Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 (1977) (holding that height and weight requirements for a prison guard
position violated Title VII because it precluded most women from applying); City of L.A., Dept. of
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 710 n.20 (1978) (recognizing the connection between Griggs
and disparate impact analysis).
50. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 243 (2005) (finding disparate impact
claims cognizable under the ADEA); Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmty. Project,
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2525 (2015) (finding disparate impact claims cognizable under the Fair Housing
Act); Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 53 (recognizing that disparate impact cases are
cognizable under the Americans with Disabilities Act).
51. See, e.g., Fisher v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 613 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1980) (cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 929 (1981)); American Tobacco v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 (1982).
52. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
53. Id. at 443-444.
54. Id. at 444.
55. Id.
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African-American employees as a class.56
he Supreme Court disagreed with the employer, relying on its
interpretation of Title VII in the Griggs decision.57 Specifically, it
looked to § 703(a)(2) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which states
Congress’s purpose for enacting the Act: “to achieve equality of
employment opportunities . . . .”58 The Court understood this emphasis
on opportunities for protected employees as a prohibition on any
obstacles that might inhibit those employees from equality in the
workplace.59 The upshot of this construal was that the state’s “bottom
line” defense was immaterial.60 The Court determined that Title VII
required equality for all protected employees at every moment of an
employment practice, not just as an end result.61 Thus, individual
plaintiffs among a protected class could sue for discrimination under
Title VII even when the entire class was not adversely affected.
C. Hazen Paper: Seeds of Divergence Between Title VII and the ADEA
While there are many parallels between Title VII and the ADEA,62
eventually the Supreme Court began to grapple with the differences
between the two statutes. The decision in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins63
is responsible for some of the separation between Title VII and ADEA
jurisprudence.
The complaint in Hazen Paper alleged that the employer had
discriminated against Biggins when it fired him just weeks before his
pension plan vested.64 Biggins alleged that the company had
intentionally discriminated against him because of his age (he was sixtytwo at the time of his firing).65 In arguing his position, he relied heavily
on the claim that Hazen Paper had fired him to avoid paying his pension
benefits.66 The Court, addressing the case under the disparate treatment
theory of discrimination, held that an employer does not violate the
ADEA when it makes an unfavorable employment action based on years

56. Id.
57. Id. at 448.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 449.
60. Id. at 455.
61. Id. at 455-56.
62. See supra Section II.A.
63. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
64. Id. at 604. The company’s pension plan vested after ten continuous years of employment,
regardless of an employee’s age. The plaintiff also alleged ERISA violations.
65. Id. at 606.
66. Id. at 607.
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of service rather than age.67
Importantly, the Court addressed the issue of disparate impact
discrimination in Hazen Paper, but declined to resolve it. Until this case,
the Court had never stated whether disparate impact claims were
cognizable for ADEA complaints.68 Indeed, this ambiguity may have
been the reason that Biggins made his claim under disparate treatment
when the accusation might have been more suitable under a disparate
impact theory.69 Nevertheless, the Court’s holding in Hazen Paper led
many courts to believe that disparate impact claims were not cognizable
under the ADEA.70 This belief took root despite the Court’s assurance
that it took no position on the issue when deciding Hazen Paper.71
D. Circuit Court Denials of Subgroups in ADEA Disparate Impact
Cases
Around the time the Court decided Hazen Paper, the circuit courts of
appeals were struggling with another issue that separated Title VII from
ADEA jurisprudence—the issue of subgroups. In Teal, the Court had
already recognized that Title VII discrimination claims need not
adversely affect an entire protected class.72 Still, courts were not
prepared to extend subgroup protection to ADEA plaintiffs for a variety
of reasons.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals was the first to address the issue
of ADEA subgroups in Lowe v. Commack Union Free School Dist.73 In
that case, two job applicants (who were also former employees of the
defendant) alleged that the interviewing and hiring procedures of a
school district violated the ADEA due to a disparate impact on persons
age fifty and older.74 The district court refused to instruct the jury that
67. Id. at 613.
68. Id. at 610.
69. Id. The Court’s analysis suggests that Biggins’s complaint more closely resembled disparate
impact because it originated from a policy that was not directly associated with age. Further, after
explaining the Court’s position (or lack thereof) on ADEA disparate impact claims, the Court simply
states, “[r]espondent claims only that he received disparate treatment.”
70. See, e.g., Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 700 (1st Cir. 1999); Gantt v. Wilson
Sporting Goods Co., 143 F.3d 1042, 1048 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[T]here is now considerable doubt as to
whether a claim of age discrimination may exist under a disparate-impact theory” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
71. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610 (“[W]e have never decided whether a disparate impact theory
of liability is available under the ADEA, . . . and we need not do so here.”); but see id. at 618 (“[T]here
are substantial arguments that it is improper to carry over disparate impact analysis from Title VII to the
ADEA.” (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
72. See supra Section II.B.
73. Lowe v. Commack Union Free Sch. Dist., 886 F.2d 1364 (2d Cir. 1989).
74. Id. at 1369. Before the District implemented the hiring procedure in question, it had begun to
offer voluntary retirement incentives to employees aged fifty-five and older. The plaintiffs’ theory was
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the plaintiffs could prove age discrimination based on disparate
impact.75 Addressing this issue on appeal, the Second Circuit dismissed
the issue of subgroups out of hand, based solely on the potential effects
of hypothetical plaintiffs.76 The court stated that it found no support for
this type of practice within the ADEA, but offered no textual analysis to
support this assertion.77 As a result of its denial to recognize subgroups
of ADEA disparate impact plaintiffs, the Second Circuit affirmed the
district court’s decision that the District’s hiring procedures did not have
a harmful disparate impact on candidates aged forty and older.78
Two years later, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals briefly addressed
the issue of ADEA subgroups alleging disparate impact discrimination.
In Smith v. Tenn. Valley Auth., the plaintiff filed a complaint with the
EEOC after a RIF when he discovered that the employee who replaced
him was younger and had less experience than him.79 In its opinion, the
court cited Lowe, finding that “[a] plaintiff cannot succeed under a
disparate impact theory by showing that younger members of the
protected class were preferred over older members of the protected
class.”80 Thus siding with the Second Circuit, the Sixth Circuit refused
to recognize subgroups of ADEA plaintiffs alleging disparate impact.81
Finally, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed the other
circuits’ stance on ADEA disparate impact subgroups in EEOC v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp.82 Similar to the facts in Tenn. Valley, this
case involved another RIF where the plaintiffs alleged disparate impact
on employees age fifty-five and older. Once again, this court rejected
recognition of ADEA subgroups for disparate impact claims, beginning
its analysis using the same rationale as the Lowe decision.83 Extending
this line of thinking, the Eighth Circuit opined that permitting their
claims might have undesirable effects both for courts and employers.84
that the District did not want to hire any new employees near the age of fifty-five when it was already
encouraging employees of that age to retire.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1373. (“If appellants’ approach were to be followed, an 85-year-old plaintiff could seek
to prove a discrimination claim by showing that a hiring practice caused a disparate impact on the ‘subgroup’ of those age 85 and above, even though all those hired were in their late seventies”).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1374.
79. Smith v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 924 F.2d 1059, 1991 WL 11271, table op. at *2 (6th Cir. Feb.
4, 1991).
80. Id. at *4.
81. Id. See also Barnes v. GenCorp Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1466, 1467 n.12 (6th Cir. 1990). In
Barnes, the Sixth Circuit stated the same position on ADEA disparate impact subgroups, but recognized
that subgroups are cognizable for ADEA disparate treatment cases.
82. EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 191 F.3d 948 (8th Cir. 1999).
83. Id. at 950.
84. Id. at 951.
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Regardless of the plaintiffs’ statistical evidence, the court reasoned that
even a subgroup would not prevail in this case due to the reasonable
justification that McDonnell Douglas had for its RIF.85 Consequently,
the Eighth Circuit joined the Second and Sixth Circuits in holding that
subgroups were non-cognizable for ADEA disparate impact complaints.
At the time, no court had taken a contrary position.86
E. O’Connor and Smith: Encouragement for ADEA Disparate Impact
Subgroups
Adding to the Supreme Court’s lineage of ADEA decisions was
O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp.87 Here, the Court faced the
issue of whether a plaintiff must meet the McDonnell Douglas88
standard for establishing a prima facie case for ADEA complaints.89
While the Court has never formally stated that application of the
McDonnell Douglas framework to ADEA cases was proper, here the
Court it assumed that it was.90
In O’Connor, the defendant fired James O’Connor, a fifty-six-yearold employee, and replaced him with a forty-year-old employee.91
O’Connor sued, claiming that he was fired because of his age.92 Because
McDonnell Douglas requires a plaintiff to show that he was replaced by
someone outside the protected class to establish a prima facie case,93 the
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer.94 The

85. Id.
86. At the time of this case, the notion of ADEA disparate impact subgroups was not entirely
without proponents. In McDonnell Douglas (1999), the EEOC argued that the Supreme Court’s decision
in O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996), discussed infra Section II.F,
permitted subgroup disparate impact complaints under the ADEA. Similarly, the plaintiffs in Lowe
argued that the Court’s decision in Teal made subgroup claims cognizable. See supra Section II.B.
However, the respective Circuit Courts rejected both arguments.
87. 517 U.S. 308 (1996).
88. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). To survive summary
judgment, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case for employment discrimination by showing “(i)
that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after
his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications.”
89. O’Connor, 517 U.S. at 309.
90. Id. at 311. But see Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., 557 U.S. 167, 175 n.2 (2009) (observing that the
Court’s interpretation of Title VII and the ADEA has not always been consistent, and reiterating that
“the Court has not definitively decided whether the evidentiary framework of McDonnell Douglas . . . is
appropriate in the ADEA context”).
91. O’Connor, 517 U.S. at 309-310.
92. Id. at 309.
93. See 29 U.S.C. §631 (2016) (limiting ADEA protection to employees at least 40 years of age).
94. O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 829 F. Supp. 155, 160 (W.D.N.C. 1993).
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Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.95
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that replacement by someone
outside the protected class was not necessary for ADEA complaints
because there is no logical connection between this standard and age
discrimination.96 Rather, the ADEA offers protection against
discrimination “because of age,” not because a person is at least forty
years old.97 Consequently, the age of the person who replaced the
protected employee is “utterly irrelevant” to ADEA claims.98 The Court
also noted that replacement by an employee who is “substantially
younger” is a better indicator of age discrimination than replacement by
someone who is forty years or older.99 In this holding, the Court echoed
its decision in Teal: discriminatory behavior does not have to affect
every member of a protected class to be unlawful.
Less than ten years after O’Connor, the Court finally settled the
debate that first surfaced in Hazen Paper by formally recognizing
disparate impact discrimination for ADEA claims in Smith v. City of
Jackson, Miss.100 The plaintiffs in Smith accused the City of age
discrimination based on a pay raise for all police officers that gave
officers under forty a greater proportional raise than those forty and
older.101 The city denied discrimination, contending that it enacted the
policy to attract and retain police officers by increasing their pay to a
level competitive with other local jurisdictions.102 Further, the city
argued that the pay raise was based on years of service, and not on
age.103 Undeterred by these explanations, the plaintiffs alleged age
discrimination in violation of the ADEA on both disparate impact and
disparate treatment theories.104 Both the district court and the appellate
court dismissed their disparate impact claim.105
Justice Stevens, writing for the Supreme Court’s plurality, began his
analysis of the disparate impact allegation by looking to the text of the
ADEA.106 Specifically, he compared it to the text of Title VII,

95. O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 56 F.3d 542, 550 (4th Cir. 1995).
96. O’Connor, 517 U.S. at 311-312, 314.
97. Id. at 312.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 313.
100. 544 U.S. 228, 230 (2005).
101. Id. at 231.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. In Smith, the Court split 4-1-3, with Justice Stevens writing for the plurality, joined by
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice Scalia concurred in part and concurred in the judgment,
and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas concurred in the judgment.
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concluding that “it is appropriate to presume that Congress intended that
text to have the same meaning in both statutes.”107 Based on this
conclusion, the Court asserted that its decision in Griggs provided
precedent on this issue, even though Griggs only addressed Title VII,
not the ADEA.108 Relying heavily on that earlier decision, the Court
concluded that the text of the ADEA intended to prevent the
consequences of discrimination, not only discriminatory intent.109
Importantly, the plurality observed the confusion caused by its decision
in Hazen Paper, but emphasized that “there is nothing in our opinion in
Hazen Paper that precludes an interpretation of the ADEA that parallels
our holding in Griggs.”110 In short, the textual similarities between the
ADEA and Title VII, combined with the Griggs holding, make disparate
impact claims cognizable under the ADEA.111 Next, the plurality also
offered its interpretation of the RFOA provision of the ADEA.112 In the
Court’s view, the “reasonable factor other than age” language permits an
employer to offer any reasonable, non-age-related explanation for its
practice to avoid liability in ADEA disparate impact cases.113 This
interpretation of the RFOA clause was the only part of the plurality’s
opinion that prevented it from being a majority opinion.114
Offering a much simpler take on the issue was Justice Scalia. In his
mind, the question of ADEA disparate impact discrimination began and
ended with the EEOC.115 Relying on the holding of Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,116 Justice Scalia stated plainly, “[t]his is an
absolutely classic case for deference to agency interpretation.”117
Earlier, the EEOC had issued an interpretation of the ADEA that
permitted disparate impact discrimination claims, and had also declared
107. Smith, 544 U.S. at 233. Since the Court’s decision in Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., 557 U.S. 167
(2009), there is some doubt whether courts may interpret the ADEA by using a parallel application of
Title VII. In Gross, the Court disallowed mixed-motive claims under the ADEA, finding that the
“because of age” language in the ADEA required age to be the but-for cause of an employer’s
discriminatory act for a plaintiff to prevail. Mixed-motive claims are permitted by statute under Title
VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2016). Notwithstanding the Gross holding, the Court’s decision in Smith
remains good law for disparate impact cases.
108. Id. at 234.
109. Id. at 235-236.
110. Id. at 237-238.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 239.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 243 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
115. Id.
116. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In Chevron, the Court
held that, where Congress has not explicitly spoken on a statute’s construction, but has implicitly
delegated an agency to interpret it, courts must defer to the agency’s reasonable interpretation of the
law.
117. Smith, 544 U.S. at 243 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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that these practices can only be justified when an employer has a
genuine “business necessity” for the practice.118 The business necessity
justification recommended by the EEOC and Justice Scalia would place
a higher burden on an employer to defend a discriminatory practice than
the “reasonable factor” approach endorsed by the plurality.119 However,
because a majority of the Court could not agree on which standard the
ADEA requires for employers to justify disparate impact discrimination,
this question remained unsettled.120 Justice Scalia’s opinion only
concurred on the narrower holding that the ADEA must recognize
disparate impact discrimination claims.121
F. Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC: Updating the ADEA
Subgroup Doctrine
After the Smith decision in 2005, there had been no major changes in
ADEA interpretation until the Third Circuit Court of Appeals decided
Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC in 2017.122 Once again, Karlo
arose from complaints of age discrimination resulting from a RIF.123 The
plaintiffs brought action against PGW under the ADEA, alleging
disparate treatment, disparate impact, and retaliation.124 The disparate
impact claim accused PGW of discrimination only against employees
fifty and older. Without precedent to support this complaint, the district
court dismissed it as a non-cognizable subgroup claim under the
ADEA.125
At the very outset of its analysis, the Third Circuit reversed the
district court’s decision on the subgroup claim, announcing that “an
ADEA disparate-impact claim may proceed when a plaintiff offers
evidence that a specific, facially neutral employment practice caused a
significantly disproportionate adverse impact based on age . . . including
subgroup comparisons . . . .”126 According to the court, any other
interpretation of the ADEA “would ignore significant age-based

118. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(d) (2004). The most recent version of the Code provides that an employer
must “achieve a legitimate business purpose” to succeed on an RFOA defense in ADEA disparate
impact cases. See 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(e)(1) (2012).
119. Smith, 544 U.S. at 240 (opining that the scope of disparate impact liability is narrower under
the ADEA than Title VII, in part because of the RFOA provision).
120. Id. at 244 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
121. Id. at 243.
122. Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 2017).
123. Id. at 66.
124. Id. at 67.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 68.
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disparities” in certain adverse employment acts.127
Appropriately, the Karlo court began its defense of this holding by
looking to the text of the ADEA.128 First, the court reiterated much of
the Smith plurality’s analysis to establish that disparate impact claims
must be actionable under the ADEA due to its similarity with Title
VII.129 Here, the court offered explicit support for the notion that 29
U.S.C. § 623(a)(2)—the second paragraph of the ADEA’s
prohibitions—necessitates disparate impact liability.130 After
acknowledging the parallels between Title VII and the ADEA, the court
again echoed the Smith plurality in its recognition of the differences
between the two Acts.131 Here, the court recognized that the RFOA
provision in the ADEA “imposes a lighter burden on the employer than
its Title VII counterpart, the ‘business necessity’ defense.”132 The court
also noted that ADEA plaintiffs must still identify a “specific
employment practice[]” as the cause of discrimination in order to prevail
in a disparate impact claim.133 Thus, while the court regarded the textual
similarity between the Acts as sufficient to infer disparate impact from
Title VII to the ADEA, it recognized the shift in burden carried by both
employees and employers in ADEA cases.134
Following this juxtaposition of the ADEA and Title VII, the court
turned directly to the issue of disparate impact subgroup claims.135
Declining to follow other circuit courts’ decisions against recognition of
ADEA subgroups,136 the Third Circuit lent its support for subgroups
based on three factors: (1) the ADEA’s focus on age as a protected trait,
(2) the ADEA’s objective to protect individuals, and (3) the “remedial
purpose” of the Act.137
First, to address the issue of age as a protected trait, the court
submitted a brief reiteration and analysis of the Supreme Court’s
holding in O’Connor.138 According to the court, “[t]he key insight
127. Id. at 69.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 69-70.
132. Id. at 69.
133. Id. at 70. The “specific employment practice” requirement originates in the Supreme Court’s
decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656 (1989). This requirement has since
been removed from Title VII plaintiffs by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2016), but it remains intact for
ADEA plaintiffs.
134. Karlo, 849 F.3d at 70.
135. Id.
136. See supra Section II.D.
137. Karlo, 849 F.3d at 70.
138. Id. at 70-71. See supra Section II.E for an analysis of O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers
Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996).
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from O'Connor is that the forty-and-older line . . . constrains the
ADEA’s general scope; it does not modify or define [its] substantive
prohibition against discrimination . . . because of such individual’s
age.”139 Further, although O’Connor addressed an ADEA disparate
treatment claim, the Karlo court found that its central focus applied
equally to disparate impact claims.140 This cross-application of
O’Connor’s holding is appropriate, said the court, because the ADEA
forbids both disparate treatment and disparate impact “because of [an]
individual’s age.”141 Based on this language common to both paragraphs
of ADEA prohibitions, the court found it proper to extend O’Connor’s
age-based protection to disparate impact claims.142
Second, the court grounded its support for subgroups on Teal’s
assertion that Congress intended Title VII to protect individuals, not an
entire class.143 Importantly, the Karlo court highlighted the Teal Court’s
rejection of the “bottom line” defense—that an employer could avoid
liability for disparate impact discrimination if a discriminatory practice
was offset by a separate practice that benefitted members of the
protected class.144 Here, the court interpreted PGW’s defense as a
restatement of Connecticut’s defense in Teal and succinctly rejected
it.145 In short, the Karlo court viewed PGW’s defense as an attempt to
justify its disproportionate termination of employees fifty and over by
drawing attention to the large number of employees between ages forty
and fifty that it retained.146 However, the court restated that the focus of
Title VII and the ADEA is on protecting individuals, not a class.147
Accordingly, the court ruled that PGW’s defense must fail.148
Third and finally, the court opined that disallowing subgroups for
ADEA disparate impact claims would be contrary to the purpose of the
Act.149 Relying on its prior holding in an ADEA disparate treatment

139. Karlo, 849 F.3d at 71 (internal quotations omitted).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 71-72. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) with § 623(a)(2) (2106).
142. Id. at 72.
143. Id. See supra Section II.B for an analysis of Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
144. Karlo, 849 F.3d at 72.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 73.
149. Id. at 74. Between its explanations of the second and third factors, the court took the
opportunity to refute an argument raised by PGW and its amici. Specifically, the court noted the
fundamental difference between Title VII protected traits, which are binary, and age, which is a
“continuous variable.” As a result, certain statistical techniques used to support Title VII allegations are
not available to ADEA claims. According to the court, subgroup claims may help compensate for this
detriment to plaintiffs in ADEA cases.
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case,150 the court reasoned that recognizing subgroups for disparate
impact claims was necessary for the ADEA to fulfill its purpose.151 A
decision to the contrary would permit employers to design policies that
discriminate against fifty-and-older employees as long as those policies
favor employees between forty and fifty.152 According to the court, this
type of harsh treatment of older employees is the exact harm that
Congress meant to prevent.153 The Third Circuit concluded that the only
solution that was consistent with prior cases and the purpose of the
ADEA was to permit disparate impact claims by subgroups.154
III. DISCUSSION: KARLO IS THE SENSIBLE SOLUTION FOR ADEA
SUBGROUPS
The current landscape of ADEA jurisprudence makes cognition of
disparate impact subgroups both logical and necessary. The Third
Circuit Court of Appeals made this assertion clear in the comprehensive
analysis of its Karlo decision.155 This Section argues that, given the
opportunity, Congress or the Supreme Court must authorize ADEA
disparate impact subgroup claims for three reasons: (1) the text and
purpose of the ADEA support disparate impact subgroup claims; (2)
Supreme Court precedent encourages this interpretation; and (3)
practical and policy considerations justify recognition of these
subgroups.156 To begin this discussion, Section III A examines the text
of the ADEA, paying special attention to the RFOA provision. Then,
Section III B demonstrates how the Karlo decision was necessary in
light of earlier Supreme Court decisions, particularly O’Connor and
Smith. Finally, Section III C examines the practical and policy
implications of ADEA disparate impact subgroups. This Casenote
concludes that recognition of ADEA disparate impact subgroups reflects
an accurate reading of the ADEA, upholds Supreme Court precedent,
and appropriately protects aging employees from unlawful
discrimination.

150. Maxfield v. Sinclair Intern., 766 F.2d 788, 792 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding that allowing
disparate treatment subgroup claims under the ADEA was necessary to protect the intent of the statute).
151. Karlo, 849 F.3d at 74.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 69-75.
156. After the completion of the Casenote, but before publication, Karlo and PGW settled this
action for an undisclosed amount. Thus, the Supreme Court will not have the opportunity to decide on
the cognition of ADEA subgroup plaintiffs for now. See Katherine Coig, PGW and Karlo Agree to
Settlement, GLASSBYTES.COM (June 29, 2017), http://www.glassbytes.com/2017/06/pgw-and-karloagree-to-settlement.
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A. Cognition of Disparate Impact Subgroups Is Consistent with the Text
and Purpose of the ADEA.
To start, the purpose and language of the ADEA authorize the
cognition of disparate impact subgroups. As discussed above, the basic
language of both Title VII and the ADEA are conspicuously similar.157
This led courts to interpret the two statutes similarly in the early years of
their existence, including a recognition of disparate impact liability
under both Acts.158 To avoid redundancy, it suffices to state that the
commonplace position before the Hazen Paper159 decision was that
disparate impact liability was cognizable under the ADEA, and that the
Smith holding restored this position with greater authority.160
In addition to their authorization of disparate impact liability, another
important similarity between Title VII and the ADEA is the focus on
protecting individuals because of their protected trait rather than class
membership.161 This focus on preventing discrimination for the benefit
of individuals within a protected class receives strong support from the
Supreme Court’s holdings in Connecticut v. Teal162 and O’Connor v.
Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.163 In these decisions, the Court
emphasized that Congress intended antidiscrimination laws to promote
opportunities for protected individuals and to bar a bottom-line defense
for employers. These concepts are easily transferrable to ADEA
disparate impact subgroups. To draw an analogy between the facts in
Teal and Karlo, simply compare the PGW employees ages fifty and
older to the protected employees who failed the examination in Teal. In
both cases, the employers attempted to justify their discriminatory acts
by pointing to the positive treatment of other members of the protected
157. See supra note 12.
158. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (recognizing disparate impact
claims for Title VII complaints); Maresco v. Evans Chemetics, 964 F.2d 106, 115 (2d Cir. 1992);
Wooden v. Bd. of Ed., 931 F.2d 376, 379 (6th Cir. 1991); MacPherson v. Univ. of Montevallo, 922 F.2d
766, 771 (11th Cir. 1991); Arnold v. U.S. Postal Serv., 863 F.2d 994, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (assuming
disparate-impact theory); Holt v. Gamewell Corp., 797 F.2d 36, 37 (1st Cir. 1986). See also Smith v.
City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005) (observing that after Griggs, courts were nearly unanimous in their
support for disparate impact liability under the ADEA because Griggs had interpreted Title VII
language identical to that contained in the ADEA).
159. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
160. See supra Part I and Sections II.A, II.E.
161. See 29 U.S.C. 623(a) (2106) (“It shall be unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or
to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age”
(emphasis added)).
162. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982). See supra Section II.B for a summary and analysis
of Teal.
163. O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996). See supra Section II.E for a
summary and analysis of O’Connor.
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class. The employees ages forty to fifty that PGW retained are akin to
the protected employees who passed the exam and received promotions
in Teal. These employees received overly beneficial treatment to
balance the adverse treatment of other members of the protected class.
The holding in Teal firmly established that an employer may not escape
liability for disparate impact discrimination on account of its favorable
handling of other employees within the same protected group. The
situation in Karlo is no different—PGW should not escape liability for
discriminating against its fifty-and-older employees by treating its
employees between forty and fifty extra favorably.
Despite these similarities, two meaningful differences between Title
VII and the ADEA have affected courts’ interpretations of these statutes.
The first difference is the RFOA exception. This provision asserts that
“any action otherwise prohibited” under the ADEA will be permissible
when “the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than
age.”164 Courts have interpreted this language as Congress’s attempt to
temper the ADEA’s restrictions because, unlike Title VII, the ADEA
does not target animus-based discrimination.165 The majority position,
proposed by the plurality in Smith and reprised by the court in Karlo, is
that the RFOA provision guards employers against some claims of
disparate impact discrimination.166 Under this interpretation, the RFOA
provision corresponds with the “business necessity” defense of Title
VII,167 albeit with a lighter burden for a defendant, who must only show
that it relied on some reasonable factor when it implemented the
challenged practice.168 Fittingly, this view of the RFOA rests on the
notion that unreasonable factors other than age are still prohibited, thus
necessitating disparate impact liability under the ADEA.169
The second significant difference between Title VII and the ADEA
originated with the 1991 Amendment to Title VII. Congress
implemented this Act in response to two Supreme Court cases that had
altered the burden of a Title VII prima facie case—Price Waterhouse v.

164. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2016).
165. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240-241 (2005). See also supra Section II.A.
166. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 238-239; Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61, 69-70
(3d Cir. 2017).
167. The business necessity defense requires a defendant in a Title VII case to show that there
were no alternative methods to implement the challenged employment practice that would have avoided
a discriminatory effect. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 243.
168. Karlo, 849 F.3d at 70.
169. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 238-239 (averring that Congress would not have included the RFOA
provision unless it anticipated disparate impact liability to be available under the ADEA). But see Smith,
544 U.S. at 251-253 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (finding that the RFOA provision acts
only as a “safe harbor” for employers to avoid liability for disparate treatment, and therefore disparate
impact liability is unavailable under the ADEA).
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Hopkins170 and Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio.171 Of
importance to this topic is the change effected by the Wards Cove
holding.172 In response to that decision, Congress amended Title VII to
remove the plaintiff’s burden to prove that a “specific business practice”
resulted in disparate impact discrimination.173 In doing so, Congress
lightened the burden of Title VII plaintiffs in establishing a disparate
impact claim; however, this relaxed standard did not extend to ADEA
plaintiffs.174 As a result, ADEA disparate impact plaintiffs retained the
heightened burden of identifying a specific business practice as the
source of discrimination to establish a prima facie case.175 Combined
with the relaxed burden on the defendant springing from the RFOA
provision, the “specific business practice” requirement created a
framework that disadvantaged ADEA disparate impact plaintiffs much
more than their Title VII counterparts.
Until the Third Circuit became the first appellate court to endorse
ADEA disparate impact subgroups, these textual differences between
Title VII and the ADEA had only served to substantiate disparate impact
liability under the ADEA. Yet, interpreted as a whole, they also lend
credibility for the cognition of subgroups. Unquestionably, courts have
interpreted the differences between the two Acts to place a heavier
burden on ADEA plaintiffs and a lighter burden on ADEA defendants
than those in Title VII cases. Currently, these standards require ADEA
plaintiffs to produce statistical evidence that a specific employment
practice has negatively impacted a disproportionately large number of
employees forty and older. If plaintiffs clear this hurdle, employers can
170. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). The Price Waterhouse holding relieved
an employer from liability when it could prove that it would have made the same decision regardless of
the employee’s protected trait. The 1991 Amendment overturned this holding in part and restored
liability in mixed-motive cases when an employee’s protected trait was a motivating factor in the
adverse employment action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2016). This change to mixed-motive claims
under Title VII indirectly resulted in the elimination of ADEA mixed-motive cases. See Gross v. FBL
Fin. Serv., 557 U.S. 167, 177-178 (2009).
171. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
172. See supra note 133.
173. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2016).
174. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 240; Karlo, 849 F.3d at 70. See also Sandra F. Sperino, The Sky
Remains Intact: Why Allowing Subgroup Evidence Is Consistent with The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 90 MARQ. L. REV. ppp, 251-252 (2006-07).
175. Due to the split of the Court’s opinions in Smith, the case’s narrow holding was that the
ADEA authorizes disparate impact claims. The Court did not decide what level of burden is borne by
the defendant in these cases to avoid liability once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case. The Title
VII standard, endorsed by Justice Scalia in Smith, is that an alleged discriminatory practice is justified
when it is a “business necessity.” The plurality’s standard in Smith, adopted by the court in Karlo, is that
an alleged discriminatory practice is justified when it is “reasonable.” Should the Supreme Court
formally adopt the former, it would heighten the burden on defendants; adopting the latter would have
the opposite effect. According to the Smith plurality and Karlo, the latter standard is more consistent
with the RFOA provision of the ADEA.
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still escape liability if they have any reasonable explanation for the
practice besides age.176 Outside of the Third Circuit, if the alleged
practice does not disproportionately affect the entire group of forty-andolder employees, the employer also escapes liability. The upshot is that,
in circuits where Karlo is not binding, an employer may implement a
RIF that discriminates based on age if (1) it retains enough employees
between forty and fifty to offset the number of older employees it fired,
or (2) it offers any reasonable explanation, other than age, for the RIF.
When an employer has these options, subgroups of ADEA disparate
impact plaintiffs have virtually no chance of prevailing on their claims.
For the ADEA effectively to protect these individuals from
discrimination, courts must permit disparate impact subgroups claims.177
B. Recent Supreme Court Decisions Have Made Earlier Circuit Court
Cases Inconsistent with Current ADEA Jurisprudence.
To be fair, the courts that have ruled against recognizing ADEA
disparate impact subgroups deserve absolution; two of the circuit courts
of appeals decided the issue before the Supreme Court’s O’Connor and
Smith decisions, and the third decided after O’Connor but before
Smith.178 Indeed, in the years leading up to the Smith decision, there was
scant support for ADEA disparate impact liability in general, much less
for subgroups.179 Only the Second and Eighth Circuits favored disparate

176. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 242-243. One reasonable factor that courts may accept as a defense is
higher pay, which frequently correlates with older age among employees. See also Sperino, supra note
174, at 265-266.
177. Courts have interpreted the 1991 Amendment to Title VII to place a clear divide between
Title VII and all other federal discrimination laws, effectively eliminating the cross-application of Title
VII jurisprudence to ADEA cases involving mixed-motive discrimination and the “specific business
practice” pleading requirement. See supra notes 27, 29-30. However, the differences between Title VII
and the ADEA are soundly analyzed in both Smith and Karlo, and do not affect the validity of ADEA
disparate impact claims nor the issue of subgroups. In a similar vein, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in
Smith, along with other pre-Smith decisions, have interpreted the ADEA’s RFOA provision to bar
disparate impact claims. See supra note 169. This Casenote proceeds under the assumption that the
cognition of ADEA disparate impact claims is a settled issue after Smith.
178. See supra Section II.D. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected cognition of ADEA
disparate impact subgroups in 1989. The Sixth and Eighth Circuits followed in 1991 and 1999,
respectively. The Supreme Court decided O’Connor in 1996 and Smith in 2005.
179. See generally Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 2003); Adams v. Fla. Power
Corp., 255 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2001); Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696 (1st Cir. 1999); Ellis v.
United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996); DiBiase v. Smithline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719
(3d Cir. 1995); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1994); Mitchell v. Data Gen.
Corp., 12 F.3d 1310 (4th Cir. 1993); Roush v. KFC Nat’l Mgmt. Co., 10 F.3d 392 (6th Cir. 1993). See
also Joel Allen, et al., Split Decisions: The Lack of Consensus on Disparate Impact Claims Under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 63 (2004); George O. Luce, Why
Disparate Impact Claims Should Not Be Allowed Under the Federal Employer Provisions of the ADEA,
99 NW U. L. REV. 437 (2004-05).
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impact liability for ADEA claims,180 and both of those Circuits had
explicitly denounced liability for subgroup claims.181 Based on courts’
positions on the issue, it is safe to suppose that the Supreme Court
decisions in O’Connor and Smith surprised many in the legal
community.
Undoubtedly, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals had a considerable
jurisprudential advantage over the courts with which it split when it
decided Karlo. First, O’Connor established that ADEA protection
hinges on a plaintiff’s age, and not class membership.182 This holding
increased the potential situations to which the ADEA can apply by
opening doors to certain plaintiffs that were previously closed.183
Perhaps a more important implication to the O’Connor decision is that it
displaced the necessity of using forty-and-over as the sole comparison
group for ADEA plaintiffs. Before O’Connor, courts required plaintiffs
to show that they were replaced by someone outside the ADEA’s
protections;184 if they could not, the court reasoned that the employer
must not have violated the Act.185 After O’Connor, a court’s focus
necessarily shifted from the protected class to the protected
individual.186 This doctrinal shift created the possibility that a
subgroup—a collection of individuals—can raise an ADEA claim even
when the entire protected class is not harmed by an employer’s action.187
Moreover, Smith’s holding upended the position of a substantial
majority of Appellate Courts when it sanctioned disparate impact claims
under the ADEA.188 Like O’Connor, the Smith decision permits a new
brand of ADEA plaintiff to raise discrimination claims.189 When taken
together, the O’Connor and Smith holdings create a “hybrid” ADEA
claim that had not existed before. This type of claim—disparate impact
180. See generally Criley v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 119 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 1997) (per curiam);
Houghton v. Sipco, Inc., 38 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 1994).
181. See supra Section II.D.
182. See supra Section II.E.
183. See Kurt Schaub, The “Substantially Younger” Requirement in O’Connor v. Consolidated
Coin Caterers Corp.: Will ADEA Plaintiffs Lose Again?, 16 HOFSTRA LABOR & EMP’T L.J. 226 (199899). By dropping the requirement that an ADEA plaintiff be replaced by a person under forty, the Court
permits claims that were previously barred.
184. See Tara Van Ausdall, O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.: Can an ADEA
Plaintiff Ever Win?, 33 TULSA L.J. 656 (1997-98).
185. See, e.g., Meinecke v. H & R Block, 66 F.3d 77, 84 (5th Cir. 1995); O’Connor v. Consol.
Coin Caterers Corp., 56 F.3d 542, 546 (4th Cir. 1995). See also Schaub, supra note 183, at 240.
186. While the O’Connor decision addressed a disparate treatment claim, its decision should have
no detrimental consequences for disparate impact claims. This decision affected only which plaintiffs
could raise claims under the ADEA, and did not address the type of claims which plaintiffs could bring
under the Act.
187. See Schaub, supra note 183 at 240; Sperino, supra note, 174 at 251-252.
188. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
189. See supra Section II.E.
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discrimination where the comparison group is within the protected
class—is tailor-made for ADEA subgroups. So when the Karlo court
handed down its decision, it did so with the benefit of two Supreme
Court cases that were unavailable to the courts that had previously
refuted disparate impact subgroup claims. To put Karlo’s conclusion of
in overly simplistic terms, the court looked at O’Connor, looked at
Smith, and did the math.
The strongest arguments against cognition of disparate impact
subgroups have already been laid out by the appellate courts who have
decided against it.190 However, as the Karlo court correctly pointed out,
these arguments can no longer stand after O’Connor and Smith.191 One
of the primary concerns of the courts urging disallowance of ADEA
disparate impact subgroups was based on an evidentiary objection.192 In
short, these courts worried that plaintiffs could manipulate statistics so
that almost any adverse employment action would appear discriminatory
toward some subgroup of plaintiffs.193 While the Karlo court recognized
this concern as valid, it believed that the risk of “gerrymandering” age
groups was exaggerated, and that courts must be able to evaluate these
claims on a case-by-case basis.194
Two other modifications to ADEA analysis have further alleviated
this concern over age-group gerrymandering. First, the Court held in
Gen. Dynamic Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline that the ADEA’s purpose is to
protect older workers, and therefore “relatively young” plaintiffs could
not raise claims of reverse discrimination under the Act.195 The
implication of Cline on a subgroup analysis is that it prevents ADEA
plaintiffs from “banding” age groups (e.g. employees ages fifty to sixty)
to create a subgroup of plaintiffs with the best chances of prevailing at
trial.196 After Cline, ADEA plaintiffs may only set a lower limit (e.g.
employees ages fifty and over) for the purpose of subgrouping.
Additionally, the Court’s O’Connor opinion imposes a requirement that
a replacement be “substantially younger” than the plaintiff to assert an
190. See supra Section II.C.
191. Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61, 75-80 (3d Cir. 2017).
192. See, e.g., EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 191 F.3d 948, 951 (8th Cir. 1999); Lowe v.
Commack Union Free Sch. Dist., 886 F.2d 1364, 1373 (2d Cir. 1989).
193. McDonnell Douglas, 191 F.3d at 951; Lowe, 886 F.3d at 1373. See also Sperino, supra note
174, at 247; Terrence J. Dee, Plaintiffs Cannot Establish a Prima Facie Case of Age Discrimination by
Showing Disparate Impact within the Protected Group, 69 WASH. U. L. Q. 337 (1991).
194. Karlo, 849 F.3d at 77-78.
195. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004).
196. See Schaub, supra note 183, at 255 (suggesting rules to prevent the possibility of ADEA
banded subgroups; Sperino, supra note 174, at 248 (observing that the holding in Cline eliminated the
possibility of banded subgroups); Timothy Tommaso, Disparate Impact and the ADEA: So, Who Is
Going to Be in the Comparison Group?, 39 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1490 (2005-2006) (expressing concern
over ADEA reverse discrimination claims and banded subgroups).
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ADEA claim.197 While the Court did not clarify the exact meaning of
this standard, lower courts have generally interpreted it to mean at least
five years,198 and probably more.199 Based on these decisions, the lower
limit of an ADEA subgroup would be at least forty-five years, but more
likely fifty or older. This restriction, along with the impossibility of
banded subgroups, already reduces the concern over gerrymandered
subgroups.
One final problem with this gerrymandered-age-group argument is its
direct conflict with the Court’s holding in Connecticut v. Teal.200 By
disallowing disparate impact subgroup claims, a court would condone a
bottom-line defense that balances the discriminatory treatment of certain
members of a protected class (e.g. employees fifty and over) with the
favorable treatment of others (e.g. employees between forty and fifty).201
The Court in Teal made clear that compensatory treatment of part of a
protected class does not relieve a defendant from liability for unlawful
discrimination against other members of that class.202 Integrating Teal’s
conclusion with the holdings of O’Connor and Smith produces a strong
indication that Supreme Court precedent favors cognition of ADEA
disparate impact subgroups. Based on these legal developments, courts
should now follow the Karlo holding and disregard prior decisions to
the contrary.
C. Practical and Policy Considerations Strongly Favor Disparate
Impact Subgroup Claims for the ADEA to Remain Effective.
Finally, courts must recognize disparate impact subgroups to
guarantee that the ADEA is effective in preventing discriminatory
practices. As noted above, most courts’ application of the ADEA
already tilts heavily in favor of employers. A disallowance of disparate
impact subgroups would tip the ADEA scale still further toward
defendants. Should courts continue to ban these claims, they would
render the ADEA largely ineffective during a time when protection for
197. O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313 (1996).
198. See, e.g., Douglas v. Anderson, 665 F.2d 528, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding that a
difference in age of five years is “substantially younger” for ADEA purposes).
199. See, e.g., Hartley v. Wisconsin Bell, Inc., 124 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a
ten-year age difference satisfied the O’Connor standard, but suggesting that six or seven years would
not); Schiltz v. Burlington N. R.R., 115 F.3d 1407, 1413 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that a five-year age
difference was not “substantially younger”); Adkins v. Safeway, Inc., 985 F.2d 1101, 1104 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (finding an eight-year age difference to be insufficient to prove age discrimination).
200. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982). See supra Section II.B for an analysis of Teal. See
also Karlo, 849 F.3d at 75, 78-79; Sperino, supra note 174, at 254-256.
201. See supra Section III.C for further analysis of Teal as applied to the issue of ADEA disparate
impact subgroups.
202. Teal, 457 U.S. at 456.
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older employees is increasing.
Recent studies show that the average age of workers in the U.S. is just
over 42 years.203 This means that over half of the workforce is currently
protected by the ADEA.204 Further, workplace trends indicate that
workers over the age of fifty-five comprise a growing segment of the
workforce, and that this percentage is likely to continue increasing for
the immediate future.205 These statistics present a vastly different
backdrop than in 1967 when Congress enacted the ADEA.206 Workers
between the ages of forty to fifty are now closer to the average age of
American employees; they are no longer are the “old folks” in the
workplace. That distinction, and the stereotypes that accompany it, have
shifted to workers at the upper range of ADEA protection. If these older
workers are forced to compare themselves to the younger members of
the protected class, it will become nearly impossible for groups of older
plaintiffs to prevail in ADEA lawsuits.
For example, suppose a business employs 1,000 individuals—500
employees under age forty and 500 employees forty and older.207 The
employer has decided to lay off 100 employees. A perfectly even
distribution of layoffs would see the release of fifty employees under
age forty and fifty employees ages forty and older. Before Karlo, a
savvy employer could avoid ADEA liability by terminating all twentythree of its employees ages fifty-five and older and twenty-seven (out of
160) of its employees ages forty to fifty-four. In this scenario, the
subgroup of plaintiffs fifty-five and older would not be able to allege
age discrimination because the layoff did not disproportionately affect
all employees protected by the ADEA. Under the Karlo holding, a court
could analyze the statistics and see that the employer had laid off 100%
of employees in the fifty-five-and-older subgroup, but only 17% of
workers ages forty to fifty-four. In this extreme, but feasible, scenario, a
reasonable jury could determine that the employer had discriminated
against the subgroup of plaintiffs in violation of the ADEA. Thus, it is
203. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS FROM THE CURRENT
POPULATION SURVEY, https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat11b.htm (last updated January 19, 2018).
204. Id.
205. Adele Hayutin, Michaela Beals & Elizabeth Borges, The Aging U.S. Workforce: A
Chartbook
of
Demographic
Shifts,
STANFORD
CENTER
ON
LONGEVITY
(2013),
http://longevity3.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/The_
Aging_U.S.-Workforce.pdf.
206. Id. Between 1960 and 1970, workers ages 55 and older represented just 18% of the
workplace. This figure dropped to as low as 12% by 1990. Since then, this figure has risen to nearly
23% and is expected to rise to 25% by 2020.
207. The figures in this hypothetical are based on the 2016 age distribution of workers in the U.S.
according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE
STATISTICS
FROM
THE
CURRENT
POPULATION
SURVEY
(Feb.
8,
2017),
https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat11b.htm.
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unreasonable for courts to continue to prevent disparate impact
subgroups from bringing this type of claim before a jury.
IV. CONCLUSION
Mass layoffs and reductions in force have become unfortunate and
common events in U.S. workplaces. Armed with in-house lawyers,
experienced HR professionals, and favorable odds under the ADEA,
employers risk little by firing most, or all, of their older employees to
make space for “new blood.” As long as the layoff does not
disproportionately affect the entire class of employees over forty, groups
of older plaintiffs have no recourse under the ADEA. When courts
disallow these subgroups in disparate impact cases, they handcuff the
ADEA and deprive older workers the legal protections to which they are
entitled. Certainly, this is not the result Congress intended when it
passed this Act in 1967.
The circuit courts that have refused to recognize ADEA disparate
impact subgroups did so on questionable grounds and without current
Supreme Court guidance. These courts were biased by a misplaced
concern that plaintiffs would abuse the ADEA to fabricate subgroups
and take advantage of deep-pocketed employers. Rather than trust
judges to discern between opportunistic scammers and genuine victims
of discrimination, these courts instead proscribed an entire category of
ADEA plaintiff. These decisions were not only unfair to older workers,
they were contrary to the purpose of the ADEA.
Promisingly, the Supreme Court has indicated a greater openness to
ADEA disparate impact subgroups. In cases such as Teal, O’Connor,
and Smith, the Court has rejected the “bottom-line” defense in disparate
impact cases, placed a stronger focus on protecting individual plaintiffs,
and expressly endorsed disparate impact liability under the ADEA. In its
recent Karlo decision, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals convincingly
synthesized these Supreme Court decisions into an authoritative new
position. Carefully considering the text and purpose of the ADEA, the
court determined that subgroups are cognizable in disparate impact
claims. Now it is up to Congress or the Supreme Court to ensure that
recognition of ADEA disparate impact subgroups is the standard rule in
all courts. This outcome is the only solution that is fair to plaintiffs,
consistent with Court precedent, and true to the purpose of the ADEA.
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